Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar
Chapter One
WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPTION OF GRAMMAR
We should begin by considering what Wittgenstein means by "grammar." For,
although, as we shall see later, he himself sometimes in fact implies
otherwise, he at least seems to employ this word as a term of art with a
meaning which bears only a rather remote resemblance to that which it has in
everyday usage.
Wittgenstein's most basic conception of grammar is that it consists in rules
which govern the use of words and which thereby constitute meanings or
concepts. Thus, he identifies grammar in general with the "rules for use of a
word" (PG, I, #133; cf. BT, p. 136); or to cite a more specific example, he
says of mathematics, which he understands to be an important part of grammar,
that "in mathematics we are convinced of grammatical propositions; so
the expression, the result, of our being convinced is that we accept a
rule" (RFM, III, #26). And since, famously, he believes that a word's use
may (generally) be equated with its meaning, he holds that the rules for use o ... read full excerpt from Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar ebook